This article analyzes the impact of free-banking on the banking sector in Latin America in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries. I use data for seven countries to compare the entry of banks and the growth of bank output prior and after the enactment of free-banking laws to determine whether free-banking (by establishing general requirements for granting note-issuance rights) lowered barriers to entry. The results show that in most Latin
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Introduction
Note issue is usually an important source of funding for banks in early stages of financial development. Cameron et al (1967) argue that "the right or privilege of note issue is one of the most effective means both of eliciting a rapid growth in the number of banks and of habituating the public to the utilization of financial intermediaries" 2 .
Similarly, Ng (1988) indicates that in the U.S. prior to the Civil War the issuance of banknotes was the "major source of funds for banks". 3 Latin American banks also relied on note issue as a major source of funding, as indicated by the high values of the ratio note issue/deposits. 4 In Mexico, in 1890-1905 total banknotes represented 74% the total amount of deposits. In Brazil, in 1870-1895 total banknotes represented 34% of the total amount of deposits. In Argentina, the percentage in 1878-1891 was 72%.
If note issue was an important source of funding in Latin America the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, restrictions on note issue may reduced the incentives to enter into the banking industry. Similarly, if note issue was an important source of funding, then the elimination of restrictions on note issue must have increased bank entry and the growth of bank output.
In a banking industry with no barriers to entry, perfect competition grants socially efficient number of banks and level of bank output. 5 Barriers to entry in the banking industry lead to a socially inefficient allocation of financial resources, and in particular to a small number of banks and a low level of output. The discretionary power of the government in granting note-issuance rights may constitute an important barrier to entry. Under a charter system, the government has discretion to grant or deny the right to issue banknotes. Note issue may be profitable, however. Note-issue profitability and government discretion to choose between different applicants may lead to corruption. In contrast, under a free-banking regime, the requirements for granting note-issuance rights are transparent. Any applicant who meets specified requirements is able to organize a bank of issue.
However, in some cases, free-banking may not reduce barriers to entry. Consider the scenario in which charter policies previous to the institution of free-banking are liberal and the government does not impose any major obstacle to the creation of banks 2 Cameron et al (1967) , p. 295 3 Ng (1988) , p. 878. 4 The sources for this data are reported in the appendix. 5 Early banks provided several financial services. Among their main services, banks received deposits, issued banknotes and made loans. Therefore, banks provided a medium of exchange and a store of value, and acted as intermediaries between savers and borrowers.
of issue, or the case in which free-banking laws include high capital and specie requirements. In these cases, the adoption of free-banking may not have any effect on barriers to entry and therefore may not have any effect on bank entry and on the growth of bank output.
Therefore, free-banking may have alternative effects on the banking sector. It may promote the creation of banks and the growth of bank output if note issue was an important source of funding and if pre free-banking charter policies were restrictive (either to all banks or to some of them). Alternatively, it may not cause any change in bank entry and bank-output growth (or may actually reduce them) if charter policies were liberal and did not impose any effective restriction to note issue, or if free-banking laws imposed severe restrictions, including restrictions on capital or specie holdings.
The effect of free-banking laws on bank entry has been analyzed by several economists and historians in the United States and Europe. Some empirical studies for the U.S. indicate a positive impact of free-banking laws on the creation of banks prior to the Civil War (Sylla, 1969; Rockoff, 1974; Rolnick and Weber, 1993 ; and Economopoulous and O'Neill, 1995). Ng (1988) , however, argues that free-banking laws did not have a significant impact on bank entry. 6 Some studies have analyzed the impact of free-banking on the banking sector in Latin America, especially in Mexico and Brazil. Haber (1991) , for example, argues that restrictions on note issue hindered the creation of banks in Mexico during this period. 7 Legal and political factors had a significant role in accounting for the financial backwardness and the stunted process of industrialization in Mexico and Brazil. 8 Maurer (2002) also argues that the banking legislation in Mexico was severely restrictive and discouraged the formation of banks. 9 This article analyzes the free-banking laws in seven Latin American countries and determines whether the enactment of free-banking lowered barriers to entry into the 6 He argues that due to competition to attract investment, charter states also liberalize their charter policies while some states enact free-banking laws. 7 Haber (1991), however, does not only focus on restrictions on note issue. 8 Haber argues that legal financial constraints in Mexico and Brazil dramatically reduced the supply of credit below what it otherwise would have been, and therefore yielded less industrial production and greater industrial concentration in those countries than occurred in the United States. In the case of Mexico, the Mexican ruler Porfirio Diaz (1877-1911) "relied on financial and political support of a small in-group of powerful financial capitalists, who were able to use their political power to erect legal barriers to entry in the banking industry". 9 In a study for Mexico, Maurer (2002) analyzes the response of banks to competition in note issue. He tests whether a greater number of banks of issue increased the proportion of earning assets with respect to total assets. The lack of balance-sheets data for a large number of Latin American countries does not allow us to extend such analysis to a sample of several countries.
banking industry. 10 Using pre-1930 data for Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Costa
Rica and El Salvador, this article examines the evolution of bank entry and the growth of bank output prior to and after the enactment of free-banking laws to determine whether a significant change in the growth of the banking sector occurred soon after the passage of free-banking laws. If the passage of a free-banking law did not lead to an increase in the entry of banks and in the growth of bank output (controlling for other factors), then the enactment of such law did not effectively reduce barriers to entry. As Ng (1988) argues, "if output did not increase after the institution of free banking, the lower barriers to entry theory can be rejected".
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The structure of this article is as follows. Section 1 describes the legislation in several Latin American countries during this period. Section 2 conducts a data analysis.
Section 3 conducts an econometric data analysis to determine whether the passage of free-banking laws increased bank entry and the growth of bank output. Section 4 concludes the article.
Free-banking laws
For several decades after independence, most Latin American countries remained under charter systems in which their national governments had discretionary power to grant note issuance rights. Granting note issuance rights to only one bank or a few banks or simply prohibiting note issue may have reduced the incentives to create banks, also limiting the growth of bank output. Eventually, however, Latin American countries passed free-banking laws establishing general requirements for granting note-issuance rights. Those laws, however, varied across countries: some laws were much more liberal than others. Differences in free-banking laws referred to capital and specie requirements, government supervision, definition of exclusive territories, among other issues.
Mexico enacted a general banking law in 1897. Prior to the enactment of this law, the federal government chartered banks granting privileges to some of them, in particular to Banco Nacional de Mexico (Banamex). Maurer and Haber (2002) argue that "since Mexico´s Spanish traditions held that all economic activities undertaken without authorization from either a general law or a special concession were illegal, Mexico did not undergo a period of free-banking. Rather, bank charters were granted at the whim of 10 There are certainly several interesting areas of research about the banking sector in Latin America. This article only refers to the relationship between free-banking and bank entry. 11 Ng (1988) 15 In December 7 1890, the government authorized the merger of Banco Nacional and Banco dos Estados Unidos do Brasil into the Banco da Republica. 16 Two years later, the government authorized the formation of Banco da Republica do Brasil 16 , and granted this bank monopoly rights in note issue. In 1896 the government eliminated all concessions, and ten years later it chartered the fourth Banco do Brasil, which took over Banco da Republica.
Argentina was subject to a charter system until 1887. The two largest banks were the Banco de Provincia de Buenos Aires and Banco Nacional. These two banks had noteissuance rights and had special links with the provincial government of Buenos Aires and with the national government, respectively. In 1887 the National Congress passed a freebanking law, 17 Piñero (1921) 19 Even the official banks Banco de la Provincia and Banco Nacional had to shut down. The government then took financial responsibility for the guaranteed banks´ debts. 20 This law was enacted in July 28 1860. 21 Information about this law was obtained from Subercaseaux (1922) . 22 The 1860 law increased transparency for the formation of banks of issue; but they (as any corporation) still required a specific Executive decree to operate. 23 Those banknotes were called cheques circulares.
mortgage bonds and gold deposits in foreign financial institutions. 24 In addition, the 27 This law regulated the formation and operations of banks of issue. 28 The law required banks of issue to be corporations with a capital of at least one million colons (around half a million dollars), and with no less than seven shareholders. 29 In addition, note issue could not be more than twice the paid-in capital, and could not be more than twice the specie holdings. The law also established some restrictions on lending. 30 The banking law was repealed one year later, when the Law of Banks of Issue was enacted. 31 However, this law maintained the same requirements for banks of issue. 32 In summary, Latin American countries adopted different types of free-banking laws and for different periods of time. Some laws like the Argentine law of 1887 or the 24 Those banknotes had legal course. 25 No other bank could issue banknotes. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and Banco Anglo Costarricense were then prohibited to issue banknotes. 26 Banknotes were not of legal tender. 27 This law was passed on January 4, 1898 by the National Assembly of El Salvador and published eleven days later. Rochac (1984) and Silva (1979) provide information on this law. 28 The law actually mentioned mortgage banks as a type of institution of credit. However, it did not regulate their formation or operations. The law rather established that mortgage banks would be regulated by another law. Other types of banks were ruled by the general legislation or by their charters. 29 Bank owners could be individuals or companies, but every bank ought to operate as a corporation. 30 Banks could not discount notes without two signatures, or without collateral, and could not make mortgage loans 31 May 4, 1899. 32 For example, banks needed to be corporations with a minimum capital of a million colons, and seven shareholders. Requirements on specie were also the same as those in the law of 1898. Banks of issue needed to meet the requirements from the commercial legislation which contained the requirements for the incorporation of companies and the law of banks of issue; whereas other commercial banks were only subject to this commercial code. For example, the incorporation of the Banco Nacional of El Salvador in 1906 was subject to the law of banks of issue, whereas the authorization of the Commercial Bank of Spanish America to open a branch in El Salvador in 1924 was subject to the commercial code (Rochac, 1984, p. 327 ).
Brazilian law of 1888 were very liberal, but also lasted a very short period of time. In other cases, like Costa Rica and El Salvador, free-banking laws lasted longer but were more restrictive. Free-banking laws were not necessarily liberal laws, and therefore the impact of free-banking on bank entry may have not been the same across countries.
Data analysis
Discretion on granting note-issuance rights may have constituted a barrier to entry into the banking industry. If it was a barrier to entry, then one might expect that several banks entered into the banking system and bank output increased faster as soon as free-banking laws were enacted, especially in the cases in which free-banking laws were liberal and did not include severe restrictions on capital, specie or other restrictions. 33 I then compare the net entry of banks and the growth bank output before and after the institution of free-banking. 34 Data on number of banks and bank output have been calculated using a large number of sources. The Appendix describes those sources. I measure bank output as the sum of deposits and banknotes. I have been able to calculate figures on banking output for Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Peru. Table 1 and 2 report the growth rates of the number of banks per-capita and bank output per-capita prior to and after the adoption of free-banking. Table 3 reports the growth rate of exports per-capita.
TABLE 1
33 This analysis of the short-term effects of the institution of free-banking may be more appropriate than the analysis of long-term effects to determine whether the lack of free-banking legislation was a binding constraint for entry or for the reduction in production costs. The idea of a "binding constraint" has received much attention lately in the literature of competitiveness for the analysis of the factors that are binding constraints (obstacles) for the growth of the economies. 34 This methodology has similarities with the methods employed by Economopoulous and O´Neill (1995), Ng (1988) and Sylla (1975) in their testing of the effects of free-banking on U.S. bank entry. Ng (1988) uses a similar time period for a comparison of the effects of free-banking in the United States, whereas Sylla (1975) compares the growth of banking assets before and after the passage of free-banking laws. 
Growth rate of the number of banks per-capita (%)
T corresponds to the year of law change (1897 for Mexico, 1888 for Brazil, 1887 for Argentina, 1860 for Chile, 1914 for Peru, 1900 for Costa Rica and 1898 for El Salvador). 
Growth rate of bank output per-capita (%)
Growth rate of exports per-capita (%)
In Mexico, in the 1880s and 1890s, barriers to entry into the banking sector were significant. Haber (1997) and Maurer (2002) Borrowing by provincial banks created a problem since, according to Piñero (1921) , the borrowing provinces lacked the financial capacity to meet their obligations and pay the debt. Privately-owned banks followed the same practice conducted by provincial banks.
In the meantime, the national government ran continuous large deficits from 1885, leading to a growing external debt: public debt increased from 117 million gold pesos in 35 New York prices of copper, for example, remained around 70 dollars per pound in 1892-1897 and barely increased by 0.4% per year during this period; but then went up by 25% per year in 1897-1899. limits on the amount of authorized banknotes, reducing the probability of speculation.
Also, this period of free-banking was accompanied by the expansion of fiscal revenues. 38 Fiscal prosperity implied that the government did not request funds to banks, which contributed to a moderate growth of the banking sector (unlike the speculative growth in Argentina) and the stability of the financial sector.
Chile enacted a free-banking law in 1860. 41 But the law was not extremely liberal: the law established minimum capital and specie requirements, and Banco de Costa Rica remained as the administrator of fiscal funds. 42 Two banks opened in the following five years (1906-10). These were Banco Comercial and Banco Mercantil. Those banks opened in 1905 and 1908. 43 In addition, Banco Anglo Costarricense, in operation from 1863 and which did not have the right to issue banknotes, started to issue banknotes from 1900. 44 Both banks started operations with a subscribed capital of only half million colones or a quarter million dollars, whereas the capital requirement to issue was twice that amount. 45 Rochac (1984) and Silva (1979) provide information on bank charters. All banks that operated in El Salvador in the 19 th century received privileges from the government, which suggest that having privileges on note issue, tax exemption, among others, influenced the decision of entry. The first bank of El Salvador, Banco Internacional de El Salvador, was chartered by the government in 1880. One privilege of this bank was the monopoly in note issue for twenty-five years. In addition, those notes were accepted in public offices, the bank´s operations were exempted of some taxes, and the bank enjoyed the same privileges as the government in judiciary procedures. However, the monopoly in note issue only lasted five years, because in 1885 the government chartered another bank of issue, the Banco Particular de El Salvador. The charter of this bank granted similar privileges, such as acceptance of its notes in public offices, exemption of some taxes, opened in the ten years that followed the enactment of the law, whereas five banks opened in the ten previous years. 46 The law of 1898 (replaced by a similar law in 1899)
was then associated with a reduction in bank entry. 
Econometric analysis
In this section I conduct a multivariate analysis to determine whether controlling for other variables the enactment of free-banking laws caused an increase in the growth of the number of banks and of bank output. I use data for seven Latin American countries that adopted a free-banking law at some point in time in the period 1860-1930. Table 4 46 These were Banco Industrial, Banco Agricola Comercial, London Bank of America, been larger in the years following the change in the legislation than in the years prior to the law change. In particular, I use data for a period of up to 21 years for each country: the ten years prior to the adoption of free-banking, the year in which free-banking was adopted, and up to ten years following the passage of free-banking laws. In the cases of Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica and El Salvador, I included the ten years that followed the enactment of their free-banking laws. In the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Peru, I select less than ten years following the enactment of their free-banking laws, simply because free-banking in those countries lasted less than ten years. Table 5 lists the variables included in the econometric model, and Table 6 where bank output is measured as the sum of bank deposits and banknotes in U.S.
dollars. 47 The dependent variables are defined in per-capita terms.
One One problem of using an indicator of economic activity as explanatory variable of NET_ENTRY or OUTPUT_GROWTH is that it may be endogenous. In the case of EXPORTS, the endogeneity problem may be an issue. A higher growth in the number of banks and a higher growth of bank output (calculated as the sum of deposits and note issue) may have been associated with a higher level of credit to businesses, including exporting firms, which therefore may have been able to expand their production.
However, it is also possible that the export sector was largely driven by external factors, and not by the development of the domestic banking sector. In this case, EXPORTS was not endogenous to the development of banking. I then estimate the model in two stages (two state-least squares) using PRICE as instrument for EXPORTS, where PRICE is the growth rate of an index of export prices. To calculate the index of export prices, I
consider the following exports: silver and copper for Mexico; wheat and wool for Argentina; coffee, sugar and cotton for Brazil; silver, copper and wheat for Chile; silver, copper, sugar and cotton for Peru; and coffee for Costa Rica and El Salvador. I first I also include the variable WAR to control for the effects of war-related instability on the growth of the banking sector. This variable is equal to the total number of deaths in wars per 1,000 inhabitants. The effect of WAR on the dependent variables is expected to be negative.
Considering that the growth rate of one variable may be negatively correlated with its initial level, I include one lag of BANKS in the regressions of NET_ENTRY and one lag of OUTPUT in the regressions of OUTPUT_GROWTH.
Finally, I include country fixed-effects to control for relevant omitted variables which remain constant over time. If those omitted variables are correlated with the explanatory variables, the estimates will be inconsistent and biased if fixed effects are not included in the regressions. Table 7 reports first-stage OLS estimates. The dependent variable is EXPORTS. In column 1 the explanatory variables are PRICE, FREE, GOLD and WAR. In column 2 I include the country-specific free-banking dummies instead of FREE. Country fixedeffects are included in both columns. In both columns the estimator for PRICE is positive and statistically significant at a 5% level. Since PRICE may be exogenous to EXPORTS and it has a statistically significant effect on EXPORTS, then PRICE is a valid instrument for EXPORTS. I conduct a Hausman test to determine whether EXPORTS is endogenous to NET_ENTRY. The null hypothesis is that OLS and 2SLS estimates are consistent, and the alternative hypothesis is that only 2SLS estimates are consistent. If the null hypothesis is accepted then we can conclude that OLS estimates are consistent, so EXPORTS is not endogenous to NET_ENTRY. Columns 2 and 7 report the Hausman statistics. The
Hausman test in column 2 compares the OLS estimates from column 1 and the 2SLS estimates from column 2, whereas the Hausman test in column 7 compares the OLS estimates in column 6 and the 2SLS estimates in column 7. At a 5% level I cannot reject the null hypothesis, so EXPORTS is exogenous to NET_ENTRY and OLS estimates are consistent. Since the OLS estimates are consistent and efficient, it is more appropriate to rely on OLS estimates to withdraw conclusions about the determinants of NET_ENTRY.
Column 1 includes FREE as explanatory variable, assuming that the effect of freebanking was the same across countries. The estimate for FREE is positive but is not significant. This result cannot be interpreted as that the adoption of free-banking did not lead to a faster net entry of banks in any country: the effect of free-banking may vary across countries. The results in column 6 indicate that free-banking in Argentina and
Mexico increased bank entry, whereas free-banking in Brazil, Peru, Chile and Costa Rica did not affect bank entry. The result for Argentina is robust to including lags for EXPORTS and to excluding GOLD and WAR from the regressions: in columns 8, 9 and 10, the estimate for FREE x ARG is still positive and significant at a 1% level. The results for Brazil, Peru, Chile and Costa Rica are also robust to changes in the specification (columns 8, 9 and 10). In the case of Mexico, however, the result is not robust to including three lags for EXPORTS: in columns 9 and 10, the estimate for FREE x MEX is positive, but is not significant at a 10% level. Meanwhile, the estimator for FREE x SLV suggests that free-banking in El Salvador reduced bank entry. This result, however, is not robust to including lags for EXPORTS and to the exclusion of GOLD and WAR from the model (columns 8, 9 and 10). Let us now analyze the effect of free-banking on OUTPUT_GROWTH. Data for bank output is available for Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Peru. are not significant at a 10% level. The larger estimate is that for Argentina: in column 6, for example, the estimator for FREE x ARG is 38, much greater than for any other country. Even for Argentina, however, the estimator is not significant. The growth of exports seems to be a better explanatory variable of the growth of bank output than the enactment of free-banking laws. As the estimates in columns 3-5 and 8-10 indicate, the first and second lags of EXPORTS are significant at a 5% level. Excluding GOLD and WAR does not change the main qualitative results. The econometric results indicate that the adoption of free-banking laws did not have the same effects on all Latin American countries. Controlling for the growth of the export sector (which may be related to the growth of the demand for banking intermediation), the adoption of gold standard, war-related instability and country fixedeffects, the results indicate that Argentina was the only country with a positive and robust impact of free-banking on the growth of the number of banks. In all other countries, the impact of free-banking on the growth in the number of banks is not significant or is not robust to changes in the specification. On the other hand, the evidence also shows that the impact of free-banking on the growth of bank output was never significant. The growth of exports (including its lags) is actually more important than the adoption of free-banking for explaining the growth of bank output.
We must be very careful in the interpretation of these results, especially for
Argentina. In this case, the results indicate that the adoption of free-banking was followed by a significant increase in the growth of the number of banks. This result, however, only corresponded to 1887-89, since free-banking only lasted until 1889. As I mentioned previously, this result may simply reflect the creation of banks due to speculation and excessive borrowing. 48 In other countries, the evidence suggests that free-banking did not lower barriers to entry, either because free-banking laws established important barriers to entry or because charter policies were not restrictive. In the cases of Costa Rica and El Salvador, for example, capital requirements were too high;
in Mexico, several restrictions prevented the banking industry from being very competitive; and in Peru capital and specie requirements were not high, but government control and healthy fiscal finances prevented speculation from happening. In Chile and Brazil, it is possible that charter policies were not very restrictive, so that the enactment of free-banking laws did not make much of a difference.
Conclusions
In theory, the adoption of free-banking could potentially promote the entry of banks and the growth of bank output if note issue was an important source of funding for banks and charter policies were restrictive and granted note-issuance rights to only a few banks. However, if pre free-banking charter policies were liberal, or if free-banking 48 If the free-banking period had lasted more than only three years and the crisis of 1891 had occurred under free-banking, then the growth rates of the number of banks under free-banking would have not been necessarily higher than prior to 1887.
laws imposed some severe restrictions on capital or specie (or other restrictions), then free-banking probably did not have any effect on the banking industry.
The econometric analysis shows that in average bank entry and the growth of bank output was not influenced by the enactment of free-banking laws. The inclusion of country-specific free-banking dummies indicates that in the case of Argentina bank entry increased but bank output did not grow faster. In the seven countries in the sample, the adoption of free-banking did not lead to a significant increase in the growth of bank output. In the case of Argentina, it seems that the large response of the banking industry was partially caused by speculation and excessive borrowing by provincial and national governments. In other countries, free-banking did not increase the growth of banking because either free-banking laws established severe restrictions on entry or charter policies (prior to the free-banking period) were already very liberal.
That free-banking did not change the incentives to create banks in the short run in several countries certainly does not imply that in the long run free-banking laws could not make a difference. It is possible that growth rates of the number of banks and bank output were greater in the long run under free-banking. However, in the short run, it seems that charter policies for most of our sample were not a binding constraint for the growth of the banking sector.
The effects of banking laws in Latin America certainly deserve more attention from the literature. There much research to be done. The effect of free-banking on financial stability, for example, is an important issue. Since free-banking laws did not lead to many more banks in the short run, it is important to know whether those laws increased financial instability. If free-banking laws did not make the system more competitive but made it more unstable, then it is clear that the adoption of free-banking was not socially desirable.
A Appendix: Data sources I used a large number of primary and secondary sources to obtain information on bank laws and to calculate series on the number of banks, bank deposits, banknotes, exports and export prices.
Information about bank laws in the sample comes from several sources. For Mexico, the main source was Ludlow and Salmerón-Castro (1997). For Brazil, I relied on the Senate´s website. For Argentina, I relied on Piñero (1921) and Quesada (1908) . For Chile, I used Santelices (1893), Sibercaseaux (1922) and Mamalakis (1985) . For Peru, I relied on information from the website of the National Congress, which apparently contains every law from 1822. For Costa Rica, the sources were Gil-Pacheco (1958, 1988) and Villalobos (1981) . Finally, for El Salvador, I relied on Rochac (1984) and Silva (1979) .
I constructed series of number of banks based on information about the year of creation and liquidation of all banks. Data on bank deposits and banknotes was obtained from a number of sources. For Mexico, I calculated the number of banks using Ramírez (1985) and McCaleb (1920) . I relied on the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (1985) to obtain bank deposits and banknotes. For Brazil, I calculated the number of banks using Imperial decrees, 49 Relatorios of the Ministry of Hacienda (1882-1897), the newspapers Journal do Commercio and O Estado do Sao Paulo, as well as Souza (1984), Pelaez and Suzigan (1976) , Pelaez (1975) , Triner (2000) , Manning and Luso (1919) , Levy (1977 Levy ( , 1994 , Azevedo (1986) , Hanley (2005) , Ribeiro and Guimaraes (1967), Albuquerque (1997), Briones and Villela (2006), Croce (2006) . Data for bank deposits and banknotes were obtained from IBGE (1990). For Argentina, I calculated the number of banks using Regalsky (1994) , as well as Buenos Aires (1889, 1897, 1899), Pillado (1899) and Quesada (1908) . Data on bank deposits and banknotes was obtained from Cortés (1994) and Vásquez-Presedo (1988). For Peru, figures on the number of new banks and bank output was constructed using newspapers, Extracto Estadístico 1927, Quiroz (1987 Quiroz ( , 1993 , and Bardella (1964) . For Chile, I relied on Mamalakis (1985) and Sebarcaseaux (1922) for information on the number of banks and bank output. For Costa Rica: I calculated the number of new banks using Gil-Pacheco (1958, 1988) , Villalobos (1981) and Corrales (2000) . For El Salvador, I calculated the number of new banks using Rochac (1984) and Silva (1979) .
Data on exports mostly come from a variety of sources. For Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Peru and El Salvador, I relied on Mitchell (1998). For Chile I used Braun et.al. (2000) . For Costa Rica I used Soley (1926) . For some countries, exports figures are expressed in domestic currencies. In those cases, I converted the export figures to U.S. dollars.
I constructed export price indexes using data for the following commodities: silver, copper, sugar, cotton, coffee, wheat and wool. For the price of silver, I used data on prices of a bar of silver in London from the NBER´s website www.nber.org. For copper, I used New York prices from Braun et. al. (2000) For coffee, prices were from San Francisco (Berry, 1984) until 1899 and New York (NBER´s website) from 1900. Sugar prices refer to San Francisco until 1899 (Berry, 1984) and New York from 1900 (NBER´s website). Cotton prices refer to New York and come from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975) . Wheat prices are wholesale prices in London and come from NBER´s website. Wool prices are for Boston (until 1890) and Ohio (from 1891) from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975) .
In most cases, exports are expressed in domestic currencies. I then used exchange rates between domestic currencies and U.S. dollars to convert exports into U.S. dollars. Data on exchange rates between the domestic currencies and the U.S. dollar comes from a variety of sources. When it was possible, I used official or secondary sources. In other cases, I estimated the exchange rate by using the specie content of the domestic currency and U.S. dollar. For Mexico, data on exchange rates between the peso and U.S. dollar come from Estadísticas Históricas de México (1985) . For Brazil, the exchange rate between the Brazilian milreis and the U.S. dollar was obtained from Normano (1935) . For Argentina, the exchange rate between the Argentine gold peso and the U.S. dollar was estimated using the specie content of those currencies. On the other hand, the exchange rate between Argentine paper pesos and the U.S. dollar came from VasquezPresedo (1988). For Peru, exchange rates between the sol and U.S. dollar were obtained from Extracto Estadístico 1927. For Chile, the exchange rate between the Chilean peso and U.S. dollar was obtained from Braun et al (2000) . In the case of Costa Rica, this country had four different currencies in this period: silver peso, gold peso, gold colon, and silver colon. I estimated the exchange rates between the first three currencies and the U.S. dollar, using the specie content of those currencies. I obtained the exchange rate between the silver colon and the U.S. dollar from Soley (1926) . For El Salvador, I used the specie content of the peso, colon and U.S. dollar to estimate implicit exchange rates between the peso and dollar (until 1900) and between the colon and dollar (from 1901).
